Beyond the Blackboard:

Abstract

This study evaluates the impact of performance-based incentive systems on teacher behavior and student learning outcomes in rural Rwanda. Leveraging a randomized control trial (RCT) in 45 primary schools across three districts, the research measures the effects of modest financial and non-financial rewards tied to classroom performance.

To complement the quantitative findings, in-depth behavioral interviews were conducted with teachers and headmasters to explore how incentives influenced motivation, pedagogy, and professional commitment. Results indicate a statistically significant improvement in student test scores and a decline in teacher absenteeism in treatment schools. However, challenges emerged around equity, sustainability, and unintended consequences such as strategic test preparation.

The study concludes that while performance-based incentives can yield measurable benefits, their long-term success depends on careful design, context sensitivity, and integration into broader professional development frameworks. The findings contribute to the policy dialogue on education quality improvement in low-income settings and provide evidence to inform Rwanda’s ongoing teacher reform agenda.

Keywords

Teacher incentives, performance-based pay, Rwanda education reform, rural primary schools, randomized control trial, teacher motivation, learning outcomes

1. Introduction

In recent years, Rwanda has emerged as a regional model for education reform in sub-Saharan Africa. With a strong policy commitment to universal primary education and consistent investments in infrastructure and curriculum revision, the country has made remarkable strides in enrollment and gender parity. However, concerns persist about the quality of instruction, especially in rural areas where teacher absenteeism, low motivation, and poor learning outcomes remain systemic challenges (World Bank, 2022). While much attention has been given to inputs such as textbooks and school buildings, the central driver of educational quality—teacher performance—has received comparatively less targeted reform.

This study evaluates the effectiveness of a performance-based incentive system introduced in selected rural districts of Rwanda to enhance teacher motivation and student learning outcomes. The intervention, initiated as a pilot under the Ministry of Education’s Teacher Performance and Recognition Program (TPRP), linked modest financial rewards and professional recognition to measurable improvements in classroom teaching and student test scores. Although incentive-based reforms are not new globally, their application in low-income, rural African settings remains under-researched and contentious (Glewwe et al., 2011; Mbiti et al., 2019). Critics often argue that such schemes may distort intrinsic motivation, encourage teaching to the test, or deepen inequalities among schools with differing resource levels.

Yet for policymakers grappling with tight budgets and urgent needs, performance-based pay offers an attractive proposition: doing more with less. The stakes are high. If well-designed, incentives can potentially realign teacher behavior with national learning goals, improve accountability, and generate system-wide benefits. If poorly implemented, however, they can introduce perverse incentives, undermine collaboration among teachers, and fail to sustain improvements beyond the short term. Understanding the nuances of such reforms—what works, what doesn’t, and under what conditions—is critical not just for Rwanda, but for other low-resource education systems seeking cost-effective ways to boost learning.

This paper combines the quantitative rigor of a randomized control trial (RCT) with the qualitative depth of behavioral interviews to evaluate the real-world impact of teacher incentive reforms in rural Rwandan primary schools. By triangulating test score data, classroom observations, and teacher narratives, we explore both the measurable outcomes and the behavioral mechanisms underlying teacher response. Our findings contribute to a growing body of literature on performance-based education reform in Africa and offer policy-relevant insights for designing incentive systems that are both equitable and effective.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on teacher incentives and motivation. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework guiding this study. Section 4 describes the research design and methodology. Section 5 outlines the main findings from both the RCT and behavioral interviews. Section 6 discusses the implications of the results in light of broader education policy debates. Section 7 concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.

3. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework guiding this study is grounded in an integrative approach that synthesizes economic theories of performance incentives with behavioral insights into teacher motivation. It serves to bridge the gap between traditional utility-maximization models and the more nuanced understanding of human behavior shaped by values, identity, and context. This hybrid framework is particularly useful for analyzing the effects of performance-based incentives in rural, low-resource environments like those found in Rwanda.

3.1 Economic Foundations: Incentives and Rational Response

At its core, performance-based reform assumes that teachers, like all economic agents, respond to incentives. According to principal-agent theory, the education system (principal) must find ways to align the interests of teachers (agents) with desired outcomes—in this case, student learning. In environments where performance is difficult to monitor and rewards are not directly tied to outcomes, agents may exert minimal effort. The introduction of financial or symbolic incentives seeks to close this information and motivation gap by making effort more rewarding and accountability more salient (Laffont & Martimort, 2002).

In this study, the incentives offered to teachers under the TPRP were structured to reward measurable gains in student performance, classroom attendance, and peer evaluations. From an economic perspective, such mechanisms should increase effort by enhancing the marginal utility of performance. However, this assumes that teachers have sufficient control over outcomes and believe the reward system is fair and transparent—assumptions that do not always hold in rural schooling contexts.

3.2 Behavioral Economics: Framing, Fairness, and Motivation

While economic models emphasize rational responses to incentives, behavioral economics introduces important qualifiers. First, individuals often respond differently to how incentives are framed: a reward framed as a “bonus for excellence” may have different effects than one framed as “punishment for underperformance” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Second, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy significantly affect compliance. If teachers view the criteria or process for evaluating performance as biased, they may disengage or resist participation altogether (Fehr & Falk, 2002).

Moreover, behavioral insights emphasize that motivation is not a monolithic construct. Teachers derive motivation from multiple sources: personal growth, student success, peer recognition, and institutional trust. A well-designed incentive scheme can amplify these drivers, while a poorly designed one can erode them. This study integrates these behavioral insights by not only examining outcome data but also exploring teacher perceptions through interviews and focus groups.

3.3 Identity and Professional Commitment

A third pillar of the conceptual framework draws from sociological theories of professional identity. Teachers are not simply employees responding to external stimuli; they are members of a professional community with its own norms, values, and expectations. Studies have shown that recognition-based incentives—such as awards, promotions, or certificates—can be as powerful as financial rewards in reinforcing professional pride and motivation, especially in collectivist cultures (Hoyle, 2001; Komba et al., 2013).

In Rwanda, where teaching remains one of the few stable rural professions and where community respect is a vital component of status, the symbolic dimension of incentives may be especially important. The TPRP’s inclusion of both financial and non-financial rewards—such as commendation letters, school-wide recognition events, and eligibility for professional development—reflects an attempt to tap into this symbolic economy of esteem.

3.4 External Constraints and Enabling Conditions

Finally, the framework acknowledges the role of structural factors that can mediate or moderate the effects of incentives. These include infrastructure quality, class size, availability of teaching materials, headteacher leadership, and district-level governance. A motivated teacher may still be constrained by overcrowded classrooms, lack of textbooks, or erratic salary payments. Therefore, this study does not treat incentives in isolation but situates them within the broader ecosystem of school functioning.

To account for this, the RCT design included stratified randomization based on school resources and baseline performance levels. The behavioral interviews also probed contextual enablers and barriers, allowing us to interpret outcomes within a grounded understanding of real-world teaching conditions.

3.5 Synthesis: An Integrated Model

The resulting conceptual framework is a multi-layered model that sees teacher response to incentives as a function of economic rationality, behavioral perception, professional identity, and contextual constraint. It posits that incentives can drive improved performance only when the following conditions are met:

• Teachers perceive the reward system as credible and fair;
• Incentives align with internal motivation and professional values;
• Contextual barriers to performance are minimized;
• Peer and institutional norms support rather than undermine reform.

This integrated model informs both the research questions and the data collection strategy of this study. It enables a holistic understanding of how performance-based incentive systems operate not just as financial levers but as policy instruments embedded in a complex human and institutional terrain.

4. Methodology

This study employed a mixed-methods design that integrates a randomized control trial (RCT) with qualitative behavioral interviews to evaluate the effectiveness and underlying mechanisms of a performance-based teacher incentive program in rural Rwanda. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches was intended to provide both statistical evidence of impact and contextual understanding of how and why teachers responded to the reform.

4.1 Research Design

The quantitative component was structured as a cluster-randomized control trial across 45 government-run primary schools in three rural districts—Gicumbi, Nyagatare, and Gisagara—selected for their variation in geographic location, school size, and teacher-student ratios. Schools were randomly assigned to either the treatment group (receiving the incentive program) or the control group (continuing with business-as-usual practices). Randomization was stratified by district and school performance level based on prior national exam results to ensure comparability.

The treatment schools implemented the Teacher Performance and Recognition Program (TPRP) over one full academic year. Under TPRP, teachers were eligible for modest financial bonuses (equivalent to 5–10% of monthly salary) and symbolic rewards (e.g., commendation letters, recognition ceremonies) based on student learning gains, classroom attendance, and peer evaluations. The control schools received no additional incentives during the study period.

To assess the program’s impact, baseline data were collected prior to implementation, and endline data were gathered after one academic year. Outcomes of interest included student test scores in mathematics and Kinyarwanda, teacher attendance records, and headteacher assessments of teaching quality. The primary unit of analysis was the school, although student- and teacher-level data were nested within each cluster.

4.2 Sample and Participants

A total of 3,850 students and 220 teachers were included in the study sample. All students were in Primary 4 and Primary 5 levels, where foundational literacy and numeracy are considered critical. Teachers from all subject areas were eligible for inclusion, though incentives were tied primarily to performance in literacy and math to align with national learning goals.

The treatment group consisted of 23 schools (approximately 110 teachers), while the control group comprised 22 schools. To ensure ethical standards and reduce demoralization among control schools, the Ministry of Education committed to reviewing control school eligibility for future incentive rollout after the pilot phase.

In addition to teachers and students, headteachers and sector education officers were engaged as informants and implementation monitors. Their insights were especially valuable in understanding school-level dynamics and policy fidelity.

4.3 Data Collection Tools and Procedures

Quantitative Data Collection involved:

• Standardized tests in literacy and mathematics administered to students at baseline and endline.
• Attendance logs for teachers, cross-verified with biometric check-ins where available.
• Classroom observations, using a simplified version of the Teach framework (World Bank, 2019).
• Peer and headteacher evaluations, conducted confidentially to assess teaching effort and collaboration.

Qualitative Data Collection involved:

• Semi-structured interviews with 40 teachers (20 from treatment schools, 20 from control schools), selected purposively to reflect gender, subject area, and years of experience.
• Focus group discussions with headteachers and education officers.
• Classroom shadowing for selected teachers to observe behavioral changes over time.

Interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda and later transcribed and translated into English. Coding was conducted using NVivo software to identify recurring themes related to motivation, perception of fairness, implementation challenges, and professional identity.

4.4 Data Analysis

Quantitative analysis was performed using Stata 17. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation was applied to compare changes in student learning outcomes between treatment and control groups over time, controlling for baseline scores, teacher characteristics, and school fixed effects. The main regression specification took the form:

Yijt = a + ß1Treatmentj + ß2Postt + ß3(Treatmentj × Postt) + ?Xijt + ?ijt
  

Where:

• Y_ijt: outcome of interest (e.g., student test score)
• Treatment_j: indicator for whether school j is in treatment group
• Post_t: indicator for post-intervention period
• Treatment_j × Post_t: DiD interaction term
• X_ijt: vector of covariates (student age, gender, socioeconomic status)

Qualitative analysis used thematic coding to extract key insights about teacher attitudes toward the incentive program. Themes were triangulated across interviews, focus groups, and observation notes. The goal was to interpret not just what changed but how change was experienced and justified by teachers.

4.5 Ethical Considerations

The study received ethical clearance from the Rwanda National Ethics Committee (Protocol No. RNEC/2021/118). All participants provided informed consent, with additional assent obtained from students. Confidentiality was assured through anonymized data handling and secure storage. Teachers in control schools were assured that participation would not affect their employment status or future program eligibility.

4.6 Limitations

While the RCT design strengthens internal validity, certain limitations remain. First, the intervention lasted only one academic year, which may not capture long-term behavioral shifts. Second, while the sample size is adequate for statistical inference, the findings may not be generalizable to urban schools or secondary education contexts. Lastly, the reliance on test scores as a primary outcome may overlook broader dimensions of teacher quality and student engagement.

Despite these limitations, the study design provides a robust foundation for assessing both the effectiveness and the human experience of performance-based teacher incentive reforms in rural Rwanda.

5. Findings

5.1 Quantitative Results

The quantitative findings of this study are based on comparative analysis between treatment and control schools across three primary outcome indicators: (1) student test scores, (2) teacher attendance, and (3) headteacher evaluations of instructional quality. Using difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation, we assess the impact of the performance-based incentive program after one academic year of implementation.

Student Test Scores

At baseline, students in treatment and control schools had statistically similar average test scores in mathematics and Kinyarwanda. At endline, students in treatment schools demonstrated significant improvement of 0.29 standard deviations in mathematics and 0.21 in Kinyarwanda relative to control schools. Gains were statistically significant (p < 0.05), with stronger effects among schools with better infrastructure and mid-career teachers. Girls improved slightly more than boys, and schools with prior professional development showed stronger gains.

Teacher Attendance

Teachers in treatment schools increased attendance by an average of 14.6 percentage points (from 72% to 86.6%), compared to just 1.9% in control schools (p < 0.01). Middle-career teachers improved most, while new and senior teachers showed smaller gains. Fewer late arrivals and early departures were reported, particularly on low-attendance days (Mondays, Fridays).

Instructional Quality

Headteacher evaluation scores rose from 2.8 to 3.6 in treatment schools (vs. 2.9 to 3.1 in control). Gains included improved lesson planning, formative assessment, and structured classroom transitions. Rubrics shared early in the program clarified expectations and contributed to this improvement.

Spillover Effects and Peer Dynamics

Some control-adjacent schools showed morale drops. Meanwhile, treatment schools saw peer collaboration rise—even among non-incentivized teachers—through informal support groups and joint lesson planning.

Summary of Quantitative Findings

5.2 Qualitative Insights and Teacher Perceptions

While the quantitative findings clearly demonstrate improvements in student learning and teacher behavior, they do not fully explain why these changes occurred or how teachers experienced and interpreted the incentive program. To address this, qualitative data were collected through interviews, focus groups, and classroom observations in both treatment and control schools.

Theme 1: Reframing of Professional Identity

Teachers described the reform as a “wake-up call” that validated their profession. Rather than viewing incentives as mere pay, many saw them as meaningful recognition. One teacher noted, “It was the first time I felt that my teaching was being seen—not just by students, but by people who matter.”

Theme 2: Motivation Beyond Money

Teachers emphasized dignity, fairness, and feedback over financial gain. Many praised the objectivity of the performance rubric. “The money is small,” one teacher said, “but the fact that someone came to see my classroom and said I was doing well—that meant everything.”

Theme 3: Collaboration, Not Competition

Despite individual-based rewards, peer collaboration increased. Teachers formed informal “teaching circles” to share strategies. One remarked, “If one of us fails, it reflects badly on the whole school… so we worked together.”

Theme 4: Emotional and Psychological Impact

Early anxiety around being observed evolved into pride and confidence. One teacher reflected, “At first I thought they were looking to catch me making mistakes… but later I saw it was about improvement, not punishment. That changed everything.”

Theme 5: Implementation Gaps and Concerns

Concerns emerged around peer evaluation fairness, infrastructure inequality, and sustainability. Teachers feared a return to “old ways” if incentives ceased. This highlights the importance of embedding reforms within long-term professional development.

Triangulation with Headteacher and Observer Insights

Headteachers and observers confirmed improved lesson delivery, learner engagement, and formative assessment. Teachers taught “not just what, but how”—with more clarity, structure, and student interaction.

Summary of Qualitative Insights

6. Discussion

The findings from this mixed-methods study offer a compelling narrative: performance-based teacher incentives, when designed and implemented thoughtfully, can drive meaningful improvements in both student learning outcomes and teacher engagement in rural Rwandan schools. Yet the implications of these results extend beyond the question of “does it work?” to more nuanced considerations of why it works, under what conditions, and with what risks and trade-offs.

6.1 Reconciling Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation

One of the key tensions in education reform literature concerns the relationship between extrinsic rewards (e.g., bonuses) and intrinsic motivation (e.g., professional pride, sense of purpose). This study challenges the assumption that the two are inherently at odds. Instead, it affirms the complementarity thesis: that well-calibrated external incentives can amplify rather than erode internal motivation—particularly in contexts where intrinsic motivation has been historically neglected or demoralized.

The qualitative data clearly show that teachers did not view the incentive program as transactional or coercive. On the contrary, many perceived it as a form of professional recognition, one that legitimized their daily effort and reconnected them with their identity as educators. This reframing was not automatic; it was earned through fair processes, transparency, and trust. As such, it highlights the non-financial dimensions of incentive effectiveness, echoing findings from studies in Uganda (Zeitlin, 2020) and Malawi (Mulkeen, 2010).

6.2 Role of Fairness, Transparency, and Trust

Perhaps the most important enabling condition was procedural fairness. Teachers consistently emphasized that the clarity of performance criteria, consistency in evaluations, and perceived impartiality of assessments were essential to their buy-in. This confirms the broader behavioral insight that people care not only about outcomes, but also about how those outcomes are determined (Tyler, 2006).

This principle has profound implications for program design. In environments where favoritism, political patronage, or opaque evaluation mechanisms are common, performance-based reforms are likely to fail—or worse, exacerbate mistrust. Rwanda’s strong governance architecture and history of performance contracts (Imihigo) likely created fertile ground for this reform to succeed. Nonetheless, continuous investment in monitoring credibility and stakeholder communication remains essential.

6.3 Rethinking the Design of Incentive Programs

The results of this study suggest that successful incentive programs are not simply about adding bonuses to payroll. They are about structuring systems of recognition and reward that are meaningful, attainable, and sustainable. This includes:

• Defining performance broadly enough to capture quality teaching, not just test scores.
• Combining financial with non-financial incentives such as praise, certificates, professional development opportunities.
• Building in peer accountability mechanisms that reward collaboration, not just individual competition.
• Ensuring that incentives are nested within career progression pathways, thereby linking short-term motivation to long-term professional growth.

Importantly, the Rwanda case underscores that scale must not precede structure. Before national rollout, pilot phases like the one studied here can serve as learning laboratories—allowing policy adjustments, testing of monitoring tools, and dialogue with frontline educators.

6.4 Education Reform in Resource-Constrained Environments

One of the most significant policy lessons is that resource constraints do not preclude innovation. The bonuses offered under TPRP were relatively modest by international standards, yet their impact was non-trivial. This underscores that the psychological value of incentives—feeling seen, validated, and trusted—can outweigh their monetary value when designed with care.

That said, inequities in infrastructure and baseline resources did limit the program’s effectiveness in some schools. Teachers in severely under-resourced environments expressed frustration that their capacity to meet performance targets was constrained by factors beyond their control. This points to the importance of combining incentive reforms with minimum quality standards for learning environments, including teaching materials, classroom space, and learner support.

6.5 Cultural Fit and Contextual Sensitivity

Another critical insight is the importance of aligning reforms with local professional norms and cultural expectations. In Rwanda, where community respect and institutional loyalty remain strong social motivators, the recognition components of the incentive program resonated deeply. Teachers spoke not only of money but of pride, dignity, and how their role was viewed by students and communities.

This context-sensitivity must be retained in any scaling efforts. A one-size-fits-all approach risks undermining the very trust and identity that make these reforms effective. Future iterations of the program should maintain flexibility to adapt to different school cultures, geographic challenges, and teacher demographics.

6.6 Sustainability and Policy Integration

While the results are encouraging, sustainability remains a concern. Teachers repeatedly asked what would happen if the program were discontinued. Without institutional embedding—linking incentives to formal career development, continuous training, and budgetary planning—the gains observed may prove fragile or temporary.

Therefore, the future of performance-based incentives in Rwanda should not be conceived as a standalone program, but as a component of a broader teacher professionalization strategy. This includes:

• Integration with national teacher standards and appraisal frameworks
• Opportunities for upward mobility and specialized roles
• Continuous professional development aligned with classroom observations
• Community-based feedback loops to strengthen accountability

Such integration can protect against reform fatigue, donor dependency, and short-termism, which often plague pilot-driven interventions in low-income settings.

6.7 Generalizability and Contributions to Global Debate

While this study is rooted in the Rwandan context, it contributes to a growing body of global research that questions the binary framing of incentives as either panacea or peril. It shows that incentives are not inherently good or bad—they are tools. Their effectiveness depends on how they are designed, implemented, and perceived within a specific institutional and cultural ecosystem.

By combining quantitative rigor with qualitative insight, this paper provides a richer understanding of how teacher incentives actually play out on the ground. It invites a shift in research and policy discourse—from “Do incentives work?” to “When, how, and for whom do they work best?”

Summary of Key Discussion Points

7. Policy Recommendations

Drawing from the quantitative and qualitative findings of this study, it is evident that performance-based teacher incentive programs hold significant potential to improve learning outcomes and professional behavior in rural Rwandan schools. However, their success is not automatic; it depends heavily on thoughtful design, contextual fit, and institutional support. The following policy recommendations are structured to inform the Ministry of Education, district education officers, donor partners, and other stakeholders involved in scaling or refining teacher reform initiatives in Rwanda and comparable low-resource settings.

7.1 Institutionalize Transparent Evaluation Frameworks

• Develop standardized, national teacher performance rubrics aligned with Rwanda’s Teacher Professional Standards.
• Train school leaders and sector education officers on fair and consistent evaluation methods.
• Encourage teacher involvement in rubric development to promote ownership and reduce resistance.

Transparency fosters trust. When teachers understand how their performance is measured—and believe it is measured fairly—they are more likely to respond positively.

7.2 Blend Financial and Non-Financial Incentives

• Incorporate school-wide recognition events, teacher-of-the-month programs, or local media coverage.
• Link incentive performance to career progression opportunities, including mentorship roles or specialized assignments.
• Offer professional development credits for high-performing teachers, redeemable toward further study or training.

These mechanisms extend the psychological reach of the program without drastically increasing its financial cost.

7.3 Address Structural Inequities Among Schools

• Establish a context-sensitive adjustment formula for performance targets based on school infrastructure, student-to-teacher ratios, and geographic hardship.
• Bundle incentives with minimum inputs support—such as provision of textbooks, classroom repairs, and basic technology.
• Monitor and mitigate disparities using equity audits as part of program oversight.

Performance should be rewarded—but only when conditions allow teachers a reasonable chance to succeed.

7.4 Integrate Incentives into Broader Teacher Professionalization Strategies

• Link performance evaluations to promotion criteria and career ladders.
• Ensure incentives are aligned with continuous professional development (CPD) plans.
• Embed the program into the education sector strategic plan (ESSP) and budget framework.

When teachers see incentives as part of a long-term professional pathway, their commitment deepens.

7.5 Encourage Collaborative, Not Competitive, School Cultures

• Provide group incentives or hybrid models that reward both individual and team success.
• Formalize peer mentoring structures to help underperforming teachers benefit from high performers.
• Train school leaders to foster collegiality and reduce fear-based management practices.

Performance cultures must be designed to elevate everyone—not just reward the top performers.

7.6 Build Feedback Loops and Learning Systems

• Establish a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit dedicated to real-time feedback on implementation.
• Create platforms for teacher voice and feedback, including anonymous surveys and dialogue forums.
• Commission external evaluations every 2–3 years to assess unintended consequences, context shifts, and emerging challenges.

This adaptive management approach strengthens reform durability and responsiveness.

Summary of Key Recommendations

These recommendations offer a pathway toward scaling incentive-based reforms without losing sight of equity, dignity, or institutional coherence. They reflect the voices of teachers themselves, who overwhelmingly expressed a desire not only to be rewarded, but to be respected, supported, and trusted.

8. Conclusion

This study set out to examine the effects of performance-based teacher incentive reforms in rural Rwanda, using a combination of randomized control trial (RCT) data and behavioral interviews. In a context where educational access has vastly improved but learning outcomes remain uneven, particularly in remote and underserved communities, the stakes for effective, scalable reform are high. The findings provide strong evidence that thoughtfully designed incentive structures can catalyze measurable improvements in both student performance and teacher behavior—without undermining professional dignity or intrinsic motivation.

The RCT demonstrated statistically significant gains in student test scores and teacher attendance, while classroom observation scores improved across multiple dimensions of instructional quality. These outcomes suggest that even modest financial and symbolic incentives can generate meaningful change in low-resource environments, especially when the criteria for success are clear, transparent, and achievable. Notably, the improvements were more pronounced in schools with mid-career teachers and stronger existing infrastructure, highlighting the importance of contextual calibration.

Equally compelling are the qualitative findings, which provide insight into the human dimensions of reform. Teachers did not describe the program in transactional terms but rather as a turning point in how they viewed their role and value. Recognition, fairness, and clarity emerged as stronger motivational drivers than cash alone. Collaboration flourished in many schools, contradicting concerns that individual incentives would foster competition or alienation. These findings reaffirm that education reform is not only technical but deeply relational and cultural.

The study also identified implementation challenges that must inform future scaling. Equity concerns emerged in resource-constrained schools, where structural disadvantages limited teachers' ability to compete fairly. Questions about the sustainability of the program—and fears of reverting to old norms—were raised by multiple stakeholders. These concerns underscore the need to embed incentives within broader teacher professionalization frameworks, ensure resource parity across schools, and institutionalize feedback mechanisms that allow reforms to evolve with time.

Taken together, the findings contribute to the global discourse on teacher incentives by rejecting binary thinking. Incentives are neither a panacea nor a threat to intrinsic motivation—they are tools that, when designed well and grounded in trust, can reinforce professional excellence. Rwanda’s experience adds an important voice from the Global South, demonstrating that performance-based reform can be both effective and respectful, even in low-income settings.

This study also demonstrates the value of mixed-methods research in education policy evaluation. The quantitative rigor of randomized impact evaluation, when paired with the lived realities captured through behavioral inquiry, creates a fuller, more authentic picture of reform dynamics. Future research would benefit from longitudinal designs that assess whether observed gains persist over time, and from comparative studies that explore how variations in incentive design shape outcomes in different cultural or institutional contexts.

In closing, the challenge ahead is not whether to scale the program, but how—with what safeguards, adaptations, and supports. If Rwanda succeeds in institutionalizing performance-based incentives while retaining the ethos of fairness, respect, and professional growth, it will offer a valuable model for other nations seeking to move beyond access and toward meaningful learning. And in doing so, it will affirm what this study has made abundantly clear: the quality of a school system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers—and teachers thrive when they are...

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